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Information Services, Technology and Data
Protection
JACQUELINE KLOSEK, LINDSEY BELIER, SANTIAGO JARAMILLO CARO, DEMETRIOS
ELEFTHERIOU, DALE FULTON, AND MEGHAN CARR HORRiGAN

I.

Introduction

The year 2008 saw a series of interesting developments related to information services,
technology, and data protection. Regulators have stepped up enforcement actions, and we
have also witnessed a particular focus on data security. Certain jurisdictions are moving
beyond requiring companies to notify data subjects in the event of a data security breach
to requiring companies to undertake efforts to prevent security breaches.
TI.

United States Federal Developments

A.

RED FLAGS RULES'

1. Overview
Congress passed the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act 2 (FACTA) in 2003 by
adding new sections to the Fair Credit Reporting Act 3 (FCRA). Congress passed this act
primarily to help consumers fight the growing crime of identity theft and included the
directives of accuracy, privacy, limits on information sharing, and disclosure. 4 The Red
Flags Rules (Rules) implement Sections 114 and 315 of FACTA.5 Section 114 defines the
entities that must comply with the Rules along with policies and procedures to identify
fraudulent activities. 6 Section 315 requires that a user of consumer reports develop proce1. This section was written by Dale E. Fulton. Ms. Fulton is a Certified Information Privacy Professional
and Senior Trainer in the Information Technology department of Goodwin Procter LLP. The author may
be reached at dfulton@goodwinprocter.com.
2. Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159 (2003).
3. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-81x (2008).
4. Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: President Bush Signs the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (Dec. 4, 2003).
5. Identity Theft Red Flags and Address Discrepancies Under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions
Act of 2003, 16 C.F.R. pt. 681 (2008).
6. Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, sec. 114, § 1681m, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681m (2008).
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dures for dealing with discrepancies to enable the user "to form a reasonable belief" that
the report does, in fact, relate to the consumer for whom the report was requested. 7 Identity theft is defined by the Rules as "a fraud committed or attempted using identifying
information of another person without authority," consistent with the definition in
FACTA;8 and a victim is defined by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in The President's Identity Theft Task Force Report, as "any person who sustained any monetary or nonmonetary harm, including the theft of a means of identification, invasion of privacy,
reputational damage, and inconvenience." 9
The Rules were adopted to protect consumers by requiring businesses that collect, use,
maintain, or dispose of nonpublic personal information, be alert to "patterns, practices,
and specific forms of activity that indicate the possible existence of identity theft." 10
These businesses are required to "develop and implement a written Identity Theft Prevention Program . . .designed to detect, prevent, and mitigate identity theft."1" The
deadline for mandatory compliance with the Rules for covered businesses was recently
deferred from November 1, 2008, to May 1, 2009, giving those covered entities an additional six months to comply.1 2 Although the Rule is in effect, the FTC will not enforce it
until May 1, 2009.13 This delay does not affect enforcement of section 315, which addresses consumer report discrepancies "or to the rule regarding changes of address appli14
cable to [credit] card issuers."
2.

Who Must Comply?

The Rules apply to "financial institutions" and "creditors" with "covered accounts."1 5 A
financial institution is defined as a "[s]tate or [n]ational bank ...savings and loan association, a mutual savings bank ....credit union, or any [entity] that, directly or indirectly,
holds a transaction account ... belonging to a consumer," as defined in Title 15 of the
U.S. Code.' 6 A transaction account is a deposit or other account from which the owner
makes payments or transfers.17 Transaction accounts include, but are not limited to,
7. Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, sec. 315, § 1681c, Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 315, 15
U.S.C. § 1681c (2008).
8. 16 C.F.R. § 681.2(b)(8) (citing 16 C.F.R. § 603.2(a) (2008)).
9. IDENITY THEFT TASK FORCE, THE PRESIDENT'S IDENTITY THfEFT TASK FORCE REPORT: COMBATING IDENTITY THEFT, at 46 (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/10/081021taskforce

report.pdf.
10. Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, sec. 11, § 1681m, Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 114, 15

U.S.C. § 1681m (2008).
11. 16 C.F.R. § 681.2(d).
12. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Will Grant Six-Month Delay of Enforcement of "Red Flags"
Rule Requiring Creditors and Financial Institutions to Have Identity Theft Prevention Programs, (Oct. 22,
2008) available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/10/redflags.shtn [hereinafter Six-Month Delay].
13. Id.
14. BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., FED. TRADE COMM'N, FTC ENFORCEMENT POLICY:

THEFT RED FLAGS RULE, 16
081022idtheftredflagsrule.pdf.
15. 16 C.F.R. § 681.2(a)-(b).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(t) (2008).
17. 16 C.F.R. § 681.2(b)(3)(i).
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checking accounts, negotiable order of withdrawal accounts, savings deposits subject to
automatic transfers, and share draft accounts.' 8
A creditor is any entity that "regularly extends, renews, or continues credit; any [entity
that] regularly arranges for the extension, renewal, or continuation of credit; or any assignee of an original creditor who participates in the decision to extend, renew, or continue credit." 19 An entity that allows its customers to pay their fees or balances on a
delayed payment basis would be considered a creditor. "Accepting credit cards as a form
of payment does not, in and of itself, make an entity a creditor."2 ° Creditors include, but
are not limited to, "finance companies, automobile dealers, mortgage brokers, utility companies, and telecommunications companies." 2' Where "non-profit and government enti22
Most
ties ... defer payment for goods or services," they too are considered creditors.

creditors, except those regulated by the federal bank regulatory agencies and the National
Credit Union Administration (NCUA), come under the jurisdiction of the FTC.23
A covered account is an account used mostly "for personal, family, or household pur-

poses, that involves or ...permit[s] multiple payments or transactions." 2 4 A covered
account is also an account for which there is a foreseeable risk of identity theft, 25 such as

small business or sole proprietorship accounts. Covered accounts include "credit card
account[s], mortgage loan[s], automobile loan[s] ...[telecommunications accountsI utility account[s], checking account[s], [and] savings account[s."
3.

26

Identifying Red Flags

A red flag is "a pattern, practice, or specific activity that indicates the possible existence
of identity theft." 27 The FTC, NCUA, and federal banking agencies have issued guidelines to assist covered entities in designing their program.2 8 These guidelines identify the
five major categories of red flags as: (1) "alerts, notifications, or warnings from a consumer reporting agency;" (2) "suspicious documents;" (3) "suspicious personally identifying information," such as a suspicious address; (4) unusual use of, or "suspicious activity
relating to[,] a covered account;" and (5) "notices from customers, victims of identity theft,

law enforcement authorities, or other [businesses] about possible identity theft in connec29
tion with covered accounts.
18. Id.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(r)(5) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(e) (2008)).
20. Six-Month Delay, supra note 12.
21. 16 C.F.R. § 681.2(b)(5).
22. Six-Month Delay, supra note 12.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(e)(1)(A) & (2)(A) (2008). Agencies responsible for the guidelines are: (1)the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury; (2) the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; (3)
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; (4) the Office of Thrift Supervision, Treasury; (5) the National
Credit Union Administration; and (6) the Federal Trade Commission.
24. 16 C.F.R. § 681.2(b)(3)(i).
25. 16 C.F.R. § 681.2(b)(3)(ii).
26. 16 C.F.R. § 681.2(b)(3)(i).
27. 16 C.F.R. § 681.2(b)(9).
28. TIFFANY GEORGE & PAVNEET SINGH, FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE "Rm.) FLAGS" RULE: ARE You
COMPLYING wITH NEw REQUIREMENTS FOR FIGHTING IDEN-ITY THEFT? (2008), available at htrp://

www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/articles/artl0.shtm [hereinafter THE "RED FLAGS" RULE].
29. Id.
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4. Prevention Program
A prevention program (program) is intended to prevent and mitigate identity theft by
including appropriate responses to red flags. 30 Under section 114, the program must contain reasonable policies and procedures designed to identify relevant red flags and authenticate whether there is fraudulent activity. 31 Covered entities must incorporate these
32
indicators into their program and respond appropriately when triggered.
The Rules require that the covered entity's program be tailored to the size, complexity,
and nature of the organization, allowing for flexible adjustment. 33 All programs must include certain fundamentals, such as a means of identifying, detecting, and responding to
red flags.34 Under section 315, users of consumer reports and any person requesting a
consumer report from a consumer reporting agency, must implement a program to deal
with discrepancies found between the report information and the user's record information for that consumer. 35 Additionally, users of the report must establish policies and
procedures to notify consumer reporting agencies with the accurate information for the
36
consumer.
According to the Rules, there must also be a periodic review and improvement of the
program with approval by appropriate committees, thereby providing the best protection
to consumers. The program and any material changes to the program must be approved
by the covered entity's Board of Directors or, if there is no Board, by a senior employee. 37
The program should include staff training, as appropriate, and provide for monitoring the
work of service providers. 38 The program must be kept relevant and current and describe
39
processes for implementation, review, supervision, and management.
5.

Noncompliance

Notwithstanding the public relations implications, there are no criminal penalties for
failure to comply, but financial institutions or creditors may be subject to civil monetary
penalties should they violate the Rule. 40 Under FCRA, the FTC may bring an enforcement action and impose a civil penalty of up to $2,500 per violation. 4 1 If noncompliance
results in injury, punitive damages may be further assessed where noncompliance was willful.42 With the FTC's recent enforcement of security breach incidents against such retailers as DSW, BJ's Wholesale Club, and TJX, among others, covered entities should expect
the protection of nonpublic personal information.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(e)(1) (2008).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(e)(1)(A)-(B).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(e)(2)(A).

33. 16 C.F.R. § 681.2(d)(1).
34. 16 C.F.R. § 681.2(d)(2).
35. See 16 C.F.R. § 681.1(c).

36. 16 C.F.R. § 681.1(d).
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See 16 C.F.R. § 681.2(b)(2)(ii).
16 C.F.R. § 681 app. A(VI)(c).
16 C.F.R. § 681 app. A(V).
THE "RED FLAGs" RULE, s-upra note 28.
15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a)(2)(A).
Id.
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ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

In 2008, the FTC brought enforcement actions against five companies that had rendered consumers vulnerable to identity theft. The FTC targeted not only respondents'
failures to maintain reasonable and adequate security programs but also their misrepresentations that personal data would be secure.
In January, the FTC issued a consent order against retailer Life is good, Inc. (Life is
good) and its subsidiary. In processing sales, Life is good had collected clients' personal
information, which it then stored on its network. The company had released the following privacy policy:
We are committed to maintaining our customers' privacy. We collect and store information you share with us-name, address, credit card and phone numbers-along
with information about products and services you request. All information is kept in
44
a secure file and is used to tailor our communications with you.
The FTC claimed that such security statements were misleading because the company's
security program did not maintain customers' privacy. 4 5 To the contrary, Life is good
stored personal data in clear text; unnecessarily retained such information indefinitely; did
not assess the risk of foreseeable attacks; and failed to implement readily-available security
measures capable of preventing attacks, monitoring Internet connections to the network,
and tracking unauthorized access to consumer information. 46 In 2006, a hacker accessed
the Life is good network and, through it, the personal information of thousands of
consumers.
The FTC investigated the company for unfair or deceptive practices in violation of
Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (Section 5(a)). 4 7 The resulting settlement agreement directed Life is good "not [to] misrepresent in any manner, expressly or
by implication, the extent to which respondents maintain and protect the privacy, confidentiality, or integrity of any personal information collected from or about consumers." 48
The company also agreed to establish and maintain a security program consisting of "administrative, technical, and physical safeguards appropriate to respondents' size and complexity, the nature and scope of respondents' activities, and the sensitivity of the personal
information collected from or about consumers." 49 In more concrete terms, the FTC
instructed the company to (i) designate an employee or employees to oversee its security
program; (ii) assess security risks; (iii) design and implement reasonable risk control measures; (iv) retain a capable security provider; and (v) evaluate and adjust its program when
necessary (Five Security Measures).5 0 Finally, the settlement included bookkeeping, re43. This section was authored by Meghan Carr Horrigan, an associate with Goodwin Procter LLP,
Exchange Place, 53 State Street, Boston, MA 02109, mhorrigan@goodwinprocter.com, (617) 570-3927.
44. Complaint at 2, In re Life is good, Inc., No. 072-3046 (Jan. 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
caselist/0723046/080117agreement.pdf.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2008).
48. Agreement Containing Consent Order at 3, In re Life is good, Inc., No. 072-3046 (Jan. 2008), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0723046/080117agreement.pdf.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 3-4.
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cord-keeping, and document-production requirements and mandated biennial audits for
5
twenty years. '
The Life is good settlement laid the framework for the FTC's other enforcement actions in 2008-four settlements with quite varied companies. First, the agency reached an
agreement with Goal Financial, LLC (Goal Financial), a student loan marketer and provider. Between 2005 and 2006, respondent's employees stole the personal information of
some 7,000 consumers from the company's network.52 In a more devastating security
breach, an employee publicly auctioned a hard-drive with the personal information of
53
34,000 consumers stored in clear text.
As a financial institution, Goal Financial must comply with the Commission's Standards
for Safeguarding Customer Information Rule (Safeguards Rule) and Privacy of Customer
Financial Information Rule (Privacy Rule). 54 The Safeguards Rule requires reasonable
"administrative, technical, and physical safeguards" for consumer information and mandates the Five Security Measures. 5 5 The FTC claimed that Goal Financial violated the
Safeguards Rule by failing to take the outlined measures to implement a comprehensive
security program. A related provision, the Privacy Rule requires financial institutions to
disclose data security policies to consumers at the beginning .of the relationship and annually thereafter. In attempted compliance with the regulations, Goal Financial disseminated the following statement: "Access to nonpublic personal information about you is
limited to those employees who need to know such information to provide products or
services to you. We maintain physical, electronic, and procedural safeguards that comply
with federal regulations to guard your nonpublic personal information." 56
The company allegedly violated the Privacy Rule and Section 5(a) by thus misinforming
consumers that it maintained a reasonable security program.
The FTC's settlement with Goal Financial mirrored its settlement with Life is good
except that it enjoined Goal Financial from violating the Safeguards Rule or the Privacy
Rule and subjected the company to only ten years of biennial audits.
Next, the FTC announced a settlement agreement with ValueClick, Inc. (ValueClick)
and its wholly-owned subsidiaries, Hi-Speed Media, Inc. and Babylon, Inc. Respondents
use Internet advertisements to connect consumers with online merchants. Consumers
must then provide personal information to purchase goods. ValueClick pledged to protect
personal information through "industry standard security measures," such as encryption,
but stored some consumer data without encryption and used a nonstandard form of encryption for other data. 57 Between 2005 and 2006, hackers infiltrated the ValueClick sites.
Respondent allegedly could have prevented the breach through readily-available or inexpensive security solutions.
51. Id. at 4-6.
52. Complaint at 2, In re Goal Financial, LLC, No. 072-3013 (Mar. 2008), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/
os/caselist/0723013/080304complaint.pdf.
53. Id.
54. Safeguards Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 314 (2002); Privacy Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 313 (2000). Both rules implement the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801-6809 (1999).
55. 16 C.F.R. pt. 314.
56. Complaint at 3, In re Goal Financial, LLC, No. 072-3013.
57. Complaint at 9138-42, United States v. ValueClick, Inc., No. CV08-0171 (2008), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0723111/080317complaint.pdf.
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The FTC investigated ValueClick under Section 5(a), again for misrepresenting its security program to consumers and failing to take appropriate measures to protect personal
information. The settlement included a record $2.9 million and an order permanently
enjoining the company from misrepresenting the manner or extent of its security programs.5 8 The incorporated consent order further required ValueClick to implement a
comprehensive security program including the Five Security Measures, to submit to biennial independent audits, and to comply with bookkeeping, recordkeeping, and document
59
production provisions.
Finally, the FTC reached simultaneous settlements with mammoth data-collection corporation Reed Elsevier, Inc. (REI) and its subsidiary, Seisint, Inc. (Seisint), and with international retailer TJX Companies, Inc. Seisint compiles consumer data, including
nonpublic information, in commercial databases. Authorized customers, often employers
and landlords, access the system through a User ID and password. At the time of the
security breach, the system allowed clients to use a common word as a User ID or password, establish an identical User ID and password, share credentials as a group, and store
credentials on cookies on personal computers. 60 The system never prompted users, even
those with access to highly confidential data, to change credentials and did not require
6
information transmitted over the system to be encrypted. '
Hackers obtained user credentials, accessed the database, and acquired the personal information of more than 300,000 consumers. The FTC claimed that REI's security program failed to protect sensitive consumer information, caused or was likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers, and was thus an unfair act or practice in violation of
62
section 5(a).
Meanwhile, the FTC investigated TJX Companies, Inc. (TJX) after an infamous breach
of the retailer's network compromised the personal information of 455,000 consumers.
TJX allegedly failed to protect customer information acquired on its computer network in
the course of business. Specifically, TJX used clear text to store and transmit consumer
information; did not employ readily available security measures to limit unauthorized access, wireless or otherwise, to the network; did not require network users to supply strong
passwords or different passwords to access different programs; and failed to detect or prevent security breaches. 63 The FTC charged the company with unfair business practice
under section 5(a) because its failure to provide adequate protection for personal information had caused or was likely to cause substantial harm to consumers. 64
In both the TJX and Seisint settlements, the companies agreed to implement and maintain comprehensive security systems, in part through the Five Security Measures; to submit to biennial audits for twenty years; and to comply with bookkeeping and record58. Stipulated Final Judgment at 6-8, United States v. ValueClick, Inc., No. CV08-0171 (C.D. Cal. 2008),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0723111/080317judgment.pdf.
59. Id. 9-16.
60. Complaint at 3-4, In re Reed Elsevier Inc., No. 052-3094 (FTC 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/caselist/0523094/080327complaint.pdf.
61. Id. at 4.
62. Id.at 5.
63. Complaint at 2, In re TJX Companies, Inc., No. 072-3055 (FTC 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/caselist/0723055/080327complaint.pdf.
64. Id.at 3.
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keeping standards. 65 According to FTC Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras, enforcement
actions against companies that have failed to safeguard consumer data should send a clear
message that "[i]nformation security is a priority for the FTC, as it should be for every
66
business in America."
C.

PROPOSED REGULATION

67

During 2008, attention continued to be directed to the issue of online behavioral advertising. Behavioral advertising, also known as behavioral targeting, is a widespread practice
used by web publishers, Internet marketers, and service providers to track consumer activities online and serve up more targeted content to consumers. Behavioral advertising is an
important component of many companies' marketing strategies but has come under fire
due to privacy concerns. Over the past few years, the FEC and state regulators have been
studying the issue and proposing guidelines and draft regulations. 68 While lawmakers and
regulators continue to debate the issue, a new lawsuit, filed in the Northern District of
California on November 10, 2008, may play a significant role in determining the future of
behavioral advertising.69
Behavioral advertising uses technology to anonymously track and tabulate consumer
clicks in order to understand an individual consumer's online activities. Cookies are used
to monitor and track web surfing habits including the websites visited, the length of time
spent on a given web page, and the content viewed. While the consumer information
collected may not seem to be personally identifiable, as it does not identify individuals by
name or address, the practice has the ability to collect and aggregate extensive amounts of
personal information. The inventory of data collected by behavioral advertising is analyzed in order to predict a consumer's future behavior and target future advertising to that
consumer based on their web surfing history.
Among its benefits, behavioral advertising allows marketers and service providers to
specifically target more relevant content and advertisements to a given individual's interests and potentially, reduce unwanted advertising. But many fear that the vast repository
of information stored about individual consumers, often without their knowledge or consent, may be easily misappropriated for unintended purposes. The privacy implications of
this unregulated practice are particularly worrisome when the tracking involves children
or other sensitive personal information about a consumer's health or finances.
In response to consumer privacy concerns raised by behavioral advertising, the FTC has
spent the last decade investigating, studying, and enforcing privacy developments. As part
of its efforts to protect online consumer privacy, the FTC has hosted several events that
65. Complaint at 3-4, In re Reed Elsevier Inc. No. 052-3094 (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/caselist0523094/080327complaint.pdf; Agreement Containing Consent Order, In re TJX Companies,
Inc., No. 072-3055 (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0723055/080327agreement.pdf.
66. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Agency Announces Settlement of Separate Actions Against Retailer
TJX, and Data Brokers Reed Elsevier and Seisint for Failing to Provide Adequate Security for Consumers'
Data (Mar. 27, 2008), available athttp://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/03/datasec.shtn.
67. This section was authored byJacqueline Klosek and Lindsey Bleier. Ms. Klosek is Senior Counsel and
Ms. Bleier
is an Associate with Goodwin Procter LLP, New York.
68. See infra notes 68-74.
69. See Complaint, Valentine v. Nebuad, Inc., 2008 VVL 5085988 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2008) (No. 3:08-cv05113).
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brought consumers together with consumer and privacy advocates, government representatives, and Internet companies including a three-day public hearing titled ProtectingConsumers in the Next Tech-ade in the fall of 200670 and a Town Hall Meeting titled Ehavioral
Advertising: Tracking, Targeting, and Technology in the fall of 2007.71 These discussions
culminated in a set of draft guidelines, Behavioral Advertising: Moving the Discussion Forward to Possible Self-Regulatory Principles, which were issued by the FTC in December
2007.72

The proposed guidelines express the FTC's optimism that privacy concerns raised by
behavioral advertising can be addressed and monitored by self-regulation. 73 The critical
questions underlying the draft FTC guidelines focus on which principles should determine what kinds of ads users see on the Internet, and where. Specifically, the draft guidelines propose that:
* Any website collecting data for the purpose of behavioral advertising must provide
clear notice of the practice and obtain express consumer consent before collecting
any data.
" If a website intends to use such data in any way that materially differs from the
manner described at the time of collection, that website must obtain affirmative
express consumer consent before using that data for behavioral advertising purposes.
• Any business that collects or stores data for behavioral advertising purposes must
undertake reasonable security measures to protect that data and to maintain such
data for a reasonable period of time necessary to fulfill a legitimate business purpose
7
or to support a specific law enforcement need. 4
During the summer of 2008, the FTC held congressional hearings on the subject, and
the FTC continues to solicit comments from all interested parties on the draft guidelines. 75 The FTC is interested in determining whether the data collected is being used for
secondary purposes other than behavioral advertising and, if so, whether such secondary
76
uses would require additional levels of protection.
While lawmakers and regulators consider the issues surrounding behavioral advertising,
a lawsuit filed on November 10, 2008, may determine that Internet service providers
(ISPs) must seek consumer's affirmative consent before selling personal consumer information to advertising companies before Congress even decides to pass legislation on the
issue. A group of fifteen internet users (and potentially millions more) seeking class action
status filed suit in federal district court in California against behavioral targeting company
NebuAd and twenty-six internet service providers.
NebuAd developed an advertising system centered on its patented hardware that purchased information from ISPs about individual users' internet activity in order to send
70. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Staff Proposes Online Behavioral Advertising Privacy
Principles (Dec. 20, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/12/principles.shtm.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Testifies on Behavioral Advertising (July 9, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/07/behavorialad.shtm.
76. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Staff Extends Comment Period for Proposed Online
Behavioral Advertising Principles; Commission Approves Final Consent Orders in Matters of Milliman, Inc.
and Ingenix, Inc. (Feb. 12, 2008), available at http://wwwl.ftc.gov/opa/2008/02/fyiO8OO3.shtm.
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web users targeted ads. After Congress learned of NebuAd's platform in the summer of
2008, Congress launched an investigation into NebuAd's behavioral targeting and related
involvement with ISPs. 77 Part of that investigation involved a formal inquiry sent to
thirty-three Internet companies "[i]n order. . to better understand how companies may
be engaged in efforts to target Internet advertising, the impact of such efforts on consum78
ers, and broader public policy implications." The six ISPs named in the NebuAd suit
each responded to the Congressional inquiry that they had tested NebuAd's platform on a
trial basis.

79

The lawsuit alleges that the defendants violated the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and California's Invasion of Privacy Act and
Computer Fraud Law, as well as aiding and abetting, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment. The plaintiffs allege that:
[t]he collection of data by the NebuAd device was wholesale and all-encompassing
[and that] [l]ike a vacuum cleaner, everything passing through the pipe of the consumer's internet connection was sucked up, copied, and forwarded to the California
processing center. Regardless of any representations to the contrary-all datawhether sensitive, financial, personal, private, complete with all identifying information, and all personally identifying information, was recorded and transmitted to the
California NebuAd facility. 80
While the suit does note that ISPs are permitted to track some user activity to monitor
for viruses, spain, and the overall health of their networks, it also alleges that NebuAd's
Deep Packet Inspection technology goes beyond that permissible purpose. The suit further alleges that the ISP's current Acceptable Use Policies do not inform subscribers that
their web activities might be sold to advertisers and, rather, that "such 'opt out' rights
81
were misleading, untrue, and deceptive."
The lawsuit notes that the defendants acted both independently and jointly to access
82
and disclose sensitive, personally identifiable information about ISP subscribers. In addition, the suit alleges that the interception of such information was intentional, without
83
users' knowledge or consent, and not in the normal course of business. The lawsuit
and control of
access
authorization
their
alleges, rather, that the ISPs' activities exceeded
such activity
that
and
communications
web
users'
concerning
information
private
users'
84
was for the sole purpose of increasing profitability and advertising revenues.
It will be very important to monitor the outcome of this case. If NebuAd fails to defend
this suit successfully, ISPs may be required to obtain users' affirmative consent before
selling user information to third parties. Furthermore, ISPs and advertisers will need to
77. Complaint at 89, Valentine v. NebuAd, 2008 WL 5085988 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2008) (No. 08 Civ.
5113).
78. Id. (quoting Letter from House Commerce & Energy Comm.).
79. Id. at 90 (quoting Bresnan Communications Response).
80. Id. at 82.
81. Id. at 87.
82. Id. at 3.
83. Id. at 9 3-4.
122.
84. Id. at
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invent new ways to monetize their users' data as it is unlikely that users' will provide the
affirmative consent required by a potential plaintiff victory.

I.
A.

State Developments
DATA SECURITY AND BREACH NOTIFICATION

85

"Every business, whether large or small, must take reasonable and appropriate measures
to protect sensitive consumer information, from acquisition to disposal. [The Federal
Trade Commission] will continue to prosecute companies that fail to fulfill their legal
86
responsibility to protect consumers' personal information."
1.

Generally

The number of data breaches reported through 2008 easily outpace the number of
breaches in all of 2007.8 7 In addition to the increasing number of breaches, the numerous
state security breach notification laws, which currently number over forty, as well as the
several pending federal bills addressing security breach notification, indicate that this is an
increasingly significant data protection issue for the entities that experience the breaches
as well as for the individuals who are victims of such breaches. s 8 There is no question that
data security practices will continue to be under increased scrutiny and that companies
must have adequate measures in place to safeguard personal data. But a company that has
implemented advanced and cutting-edge technology to protect data can still experience a
data security breach. Companies should take appropriate actions not only to prevent security breaches, but also to have mechanisms in place to send security breach notifications
in the most expedient time possible in the event there is a breach that triggers notification.
Interestingly, however, although we continue to see an increasing number of security
breaches, the extent to which fraud can be accurately attributed to a particular data breach
remains unclear.
2.

Data Security

From a federal standpoint, there are sectoral laws that require companies to safeguard
personal information. 89 Even if companies are not subject to a federal sectoral law requiring data security, however, companies must still safeguard personal information (1) from
an industry or customer expectation standpoint and (2) from a FTC perspective, as they
85. This section was authored by Demetrios Eleftheriou of the General Counsel's Office at American
Express.
86. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Company Will Pay $50,000 Penalty for Tossing Consumers'
Credit Report Information in Unsecured Dumpster (Dec. 18, 2007) (quoting Chairman Deborah Platt
Majoras), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/12/aumort.shtm.
87. See Identity Theft Resource Center, ITRC 2008 Breach List, http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/publish/libsurvey/ITRC2008_BreachList.shtmI (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
88. For list of legislation requiring notification of security breaches involving personal information, see
National Conference of State Legislatures,State Security Breach Notification Laws, http://ncsl.org/programslis/
cip/priv/breachlaws.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2009) [hereinafter State Security Breach Notification Laws].
89. See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999); Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
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could face potential enforcement action by the FTC for engaging in an unfair or deceptive
trade practice. 90 Like in prior years, the FTC has brought enforcement actions in 2008
against companies for failing to adequately protect personal data. 91
From a state standpoint, Massachusetts passed a comprehensive data security law in
2008, which requires companies to have a written and comprehensive information security
program to protect the personal information of Massachusetts residents. 92 Under the new
law, companies must encrypt all personal data, including data transmitted wirelessly and
over the Internet, and data stored on portable devices such as jumpdrives and blackberries.
In addition, this new law requires companies to obtain from third-party service providers a
written certification that such third parties have a written, comprehensive information
security program that complies with the new rule. 93 Like California and its pioneering
security breach notification law, the new Massachusetts law could serve as a model for
other states and trigger a flurry of comprehensive state data security laws over the next few
years. As for other states, Nevada requires encryption as of October 1, 2008.94 Specifically, under the Nevada law, businesses "shall not transfer any personal information of a
customer through an electronic transmission other than a facsimile to a person outside of
the secure system of the business unless the business uses encryption to ensure the security
of electronic transmission." 95 Connecticut also passed a new law that would make busi96
nesses liable for an intentional failure to properly protect or dispose of personal data.

3. Data Security Breach Notification
As of November 2008, forty-four states and the District of Columbia have security
breach notification laws on the books. 97 Given the large number of state security breach
laws, many companies are asking for a federal law that would streamline and preempt the
inconsistent notification approach brought on by the state laws. Although several federal
security breach notification bills were introduced in the 110th Congress, none are expected to pass. We expect to see the new 111th Congress introduce similar security
breach notification bills, but it is unclear whether such legislation will pass in 2009. Even
if a federal law does pass, a federal law that does not fully preempt inconsistent state laws,
unfortunately, will simply be another law to add to the hodge-podge of state notification
laws and continue to create compliance headaches for businesses.

90. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2008).
91. For list of enforcement actions, seeFederal Trade Commission, Enforcement, http://ftc.gov/privacy/
privacyinitiatives/promises-enf.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2009).
92. See 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17 (2008). The original deadline to comply with the Massachusetts data
security law was January 1, 2009; however, Massachusetts will phase in the compliance deadline-May 1,
2009, for general compliance and January 1, 2010, for encrypting portable devices, such as jumpdrives.
93. See id.
94. See NEv. REv. STAT. § 597.970 (2008).
95. See id.
96. See 2008 Conn. Acts page no. 167 (Reg. Sess.). Under the new Connecticut law, businesses could be
subject to fines of up to $500,000. This new law took effect on October 1, 2008.
97. See State Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 88.
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B. RFID 98
The use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) to track individuals is a particularly
sensitive issue, and accordingly, several states have addressed or attempted to address the
issue through legislation. Legislators, at least in twenty states, introduced privacy legislation relating to the use of RFID in 2008, but only a few notable bills were passed at the
state level. 99 Reacting to concern over the possibility of human RFID implantation, a new
California law in effect since January 1, 2008, regulates the implantation of RFIDs and
other identification devices in humans. 100 California's new law creates a private right of
action for individuals implanted with a subcutaneous identification device in violation of
this new law including civil actions for actual damages, compensatory damages, punitive
damages, injunctive relief, and any other appropriate relief. Notably, California's legislation does not prohibit or otherwise address the use of RFID in clothing or other wearable
1
objects whether know. or unknown to the person wearing it.' 0
102
C. COPPA ENFORCEMENT Ac-TONS

When Congress enacted the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA),'03 the
primary goal was to place parents in control of what personally identifiable information
(PI) was collected from their young children while online. COPPA sets forth a framework of practices that governs the collection of, access to, and use of P11 by websites that
are directed toward children. COPPA mandates strict requirements concerning parental
oversight and consent on behalf of their children. Among other requirements, COPPA
requires a commercial website operator to meet specific requirements prior to collecting,
using, or disclosing PII from children. All of the requirements are to increase the level of
parental involvement. Specifically, under COPPA, the website operator must: (1) provide
clear, understandable, and complete notice of its information practices, including specific
disclosures directly to the parent when required by COPPA; (2) obtain verifiable parental
98. This section was authored by Lindsey Bleirer, an Associate with Goodwin Procter.
99. See National Conference of State Legislators, 2008 Privacy Legislation Related to Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/privacy/rfid08.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2009).
100. CAL. CIv. CODE § 52.7 (West 2009).
101. The "persons" covered by California law include "individual[s], business association[s], partnership[s],
limited partnership[s], corporation[s], limited liability compan[ies], trust[s], estate[s], cooperative association[s], or other entit[ies]." CAL. Cry. CODE § 52.7(h)(2) (West 2009). This is particularly notable in light of
the pending case in California in which parents from Sutter, a small town California, contacted the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Northern California in 2005 after their daughters returned from their
public middle school with new identification badges that appeared to have an embedded microchip. For
more information about Sutter, see Press Release, ACLU of Northern California, Privacy Rights are at
Risk-Parents and Civil Liberties Groups Urge School District to Terminate Use of Tracking Devices (Feb.
7, 2005), available at http://www.aclunc.org/news/press-releases/privacy-rights-are-at-risk-_parents-andciviljiberties-groups-urge-school-districtto-terminate-useof._trackingdevices.shtnl. See also Press Release, ACLU of Northern California, Victory for Students, Parents and Civil Liberties Groups-Company
Announces it will End Tracking Pilot Program (Feb. 16, 2005), available at http://www.aclunc.org/news/
press-releases/victory-for-students,-parents-and-civil-liberties-groups---company-announces-itL-ill-end_
tracking-pilot.program.shtml.
102. This section was authored by Jacqueline Klosek, Senior Counsel with Goodwin Procter LLP, New
York, and Dale E. Fulton, a Certified Information Privacy Professional and Senior Trainer in the Information
Technology department of Goodwin Procter LLP.
103. Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2008).
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consent prior to collecting, using, or disclosing PH from children; (3) give parents the
option to consent to the collection and internal use of their children's PH without consenting to the disclosure of that information to third parties; and (4) provide a reasonable
means for parents to review the information collected from their children and to prohibit
the further use of such information.
COPPA has been enforced vigorously at the federal level by the FTC, but COPPA also
empowers the states' attorneys general to bring civil action on behalf of state residents.
This power recently came to the forefront of public attention when the Texas Attorney
General brought COPPA-related enforcement actions against three out-of-state companies. The three websites in the Texas actions had parental consent features that were
easily manipulated and by-passed with relative ease by savvy children. While the Texas
Attorney General elected to pursue enforcement actions against these three sites, arguably, many sites are in the same position in that they are relying upon features that can be
circumvented. Due to the lack of reasonable controls, children were allowed to access
various features of these websites without parental knowledge.
Texas Attorney General Abbott claimed Santa.com'0 collected a wide range of P11 such
as: first and last name; home or other physical address including street name and name of
a city or town; e-mail address or other online contact information, including but not limited to an instant messaging user identifier or a screen name that reveals an individual's email address; telephone number; social security number; persistent identifier such as a
customer number held in a cookie; combination of a last name or photograph of an individual with other information such that the combination permits physical or online contacting; or information concerning the child or the parents of that child.
The second website to receive attention from the Texas Attorney General was Gamesradar.com. 105 Gamesradar.com is a website designed for people with an interest in video
games. The website includes content or allows access to content inappropriate for children along with games clearly targeted to young children such as Disney's Chicken Little,
Ice Age, and Cars. To access certain features of the website, one must register by providing
certain PH, including first and last name, e-mail address, physical address, gender, and
date of birth chosen from a drop-down menu. The menu, however, only allows a selection from years prior to 1995, thereby not allowing the visitor to select an age that would
make him/her younger than thirteen. Thus, if a ten-year-old child born in 1998 attempts
to register, the closest birth year that could be selected would be 1994, indicating a current age of thirteen.
TheDollPalace.com 106 also caught the attention of the Texas Attorney General. At
TheDollPalace.com website, children create and play with web-based dolls, including sexually explicit dolls. To use features or participate in activities of the website, children are
required to register. Activities, such as participating in chat rooms, are encouraged by
offering "doll points," which may then be used to purchase items on the website. Registering entails providing first and last name, e-mail address, and date of birth, state, zip
code, country, and gender. Accessing additional website features requires a profile be
104. Texas v. Small's Seed Co., No. 07 Civ. 002600 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2007).
105. Complaint, Texas v. Future Us, Inc., 2007 WL 4817985 (W'.D. Tex. Dec, 5, 2007) (No. 07 Civ. 987).
106. Complaint, Texas v. Doll Palace Corp., WL 4817946 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2007) (No. 07 Civ. 988,
2007).
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filled out that consists of a ten page questionnaire including detailed PH such as height,
weight, eye color, details about personal habits, and whether the child has their own computer or Internet access only in a public location. The child is asked questions about the
type of person they are interested in meeting, for example, age importance, including the
option of meeting someone older as well as those within five miles of their location. This
PH is easily accessed by other members of the website. The website's parental permission
page requires only a click "OK" for the child to register, allowing easy circumvention of
COPPA consent requirements. Additionally, parental consent is requested after collection
of the child's PII has already taken place. The permission page does not provide the
parent with website operator contact information, the option to review and revoke consent, or specify the type of information collected.
While the Texas actions are notable as they represent the first state-based enforcements
of COPPA, it is important to recognize that the federal authorities also remain active in
investigating and enforcing COPPA violations. The recent FTC enforcement action
against imbee.com, 10 7 a social networking website directed to kids ages eight to fourteen,
collects PH from children as defined in COPPA. After providing their PIT, the child is
able to post text, photographs, and graphics to their personal page, which is kept private
until the child's parent has completed the registration process. But, according to the
FTC, if the parent failed to complete the registration process, imbee.com nonetheless
continued to maintain the child's data. Additionally, according to the FTC, imbee.com
failed to disclose to the parent that their child's PII had already been collected and failed
to provide the parent the right to review or have their child's information deleted. Furthermore, imbee.com's privacy policy failed to disclose that imbee.com would use the
child's personal information to mail the child "imbee cards" bearing the child's name,
address, photo, imbee name, and imbee profile page URL.
These recent cases emphasize the critical importance of ensuring that one's web operations comply with COPPA requirements. Companies that fail to comply with the requirements of COPPA risk not only fines but also damage to their brand reputation and
business. In the above cases, injunctions were sought against the defendants along with
damages, restitution, or other compensation. A court can hold violators of COPPA liable
for civil penalties of up to $11,000 per violation. The amount of the penalty may turn on
a number of factors including the egregiousness of the violation, the number of children
involved, the size of the company, the amount and type of PH collected, how the information was used, and whether it was shared with third parties. Fines in FTC actions have
been increasing steadily, beginning with injunctive relief in some of the earlier cases and
progressing to the most recent fine of one million dollars in the Xanga.com case.

107. Complaint, United States v. Industrious Kid, Inc., 2008 WL 243658 (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 28, 2008)
(No. 08 Civ. 639).
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International Developments108

Since 1991, Colombia's exiguous data protection regime was based on Article 15 of the
Colombian Constitution'0 9 and the jurisprudence issued by the Constitutional Court,
which was mainly based on controversial issues involving financial data and credit reports.
After years of struggling and controversy, early this year, Congress finally passed a bill
regulating data protection in Colombia. Because of the special constitutional nature of
this bill, a previous review by the Constitutional Court was needed. Through a ruling
dated October 16, 2008,110 the Colombian Constitutional Court upheld the Data Protection Bill (the Bill). Consequently, very soon, Colombia will have a regulation on the matter, which unfortunately cannot be considered as a comprehensive statute as regards data
privacy.
Even though in principle the Bill applies to the gathering and transfer of all kinds of
data concerning natural or legal persons, it really focuses mainly in the conditions for
protection and processing of financial data, the latter of which is understood to mean
information related to operations involving monetary transactions in trade, commerce,
financial services, credit, and transfer of data to and from third countries.
The Bill introduces several principles that must be observed upon the collection, gathering, usage, and transfer of data. Said principles"' are more or less similar to those
provided under the European Union (EU) Directives or the ones set forth in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) guidelines, the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) principles, and the Code of Fair Information Practices.
Three kinds of data are described and regulated in the Bill: (i) public data, regarded as
information considered as public by law or by constitutional mandate, such as public
records; (ii) semi-Private data, understood as private information of general interest, such
as financial data; and (iii) private data, which relates to the information reserved to the
intimate sphere of the person, such as sexual preferences and personal interests.
108. Santiago Jaramillo Caro is a Partner at Gtmez-Pinz6n Zuleta Abogados S.A. He may be reached for
comment at sjaramillo@gpzlegal.com. The author wishes to recognize the significant collaboration of Miguel
Villamizar in the research and drafting of this section.
109. Article 15 provides:
Every individual has the right to personal and family intimacy and to his/her good reputation, and
the State will respect them and have these rights and ensure they are respected. Similarly, individuals have the right to know, update, and rectify information gathered about them in data banks
and in records of public and private entities. Freedom and other guarantees approved in the
Constitution will be respected in the gathering, handling, and circulation of data. Correspondence and other forms of private communication are inviolable. They may only be intercepted or
recorded pursuant to a court order, following the formalities established by law. For tax or legal
purposes and for cases of inspections, supervision, and intervention of the state, the submission of
accounting records and other private documents may be required within the limits provided by
law.
Constitution De Politica Columbia art. 15 (Colom.) (unofficial translation), available at http://confinder.richmond.edu (emphasis added).
110. Ruling No. C-1011 of 2008.
111. These principles apply to all kinds of data (public, semiprivate, or private) and are: i) accuracy of data;
ii) end use of data; iii) limited circulation of data; iv) limited availability of data; v) integral interpretation of
constitutional rights; vi) data security; and vii) data confidentiality.
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The Bill regulates and applies mainly to the activities performed by data sources, data
administrators,and data users.
Data sources collect data from data owners and must: i) guarantee the accuracy and
truthfulness of the data submitted to data administrators and users; ii) give notice and
obtain previous consent for the usage of data from data owners; 112 iii) keep the data updated; iv) rectify inaccurate information; v) limit the circulation of data to the scope requests made by administrators; vi) receive and solve claims from data owners; vii) inform
the data administrator of any pending claims over the accuracy of data; and viii) comply
with all the instructions issued by the control governmental authority.
Data administrators gather, process, keep, and distribute data directly collected or received from data sources. Data administrators must, inter alia: i) guarantee accessibility
to data owners as well as the possibility to update, rectify, or modify the information when
inaccurate or false; ii) allow limited access and circulation of the data under the conditions
authorized by the data owner; iii) request from the data source the authorization for usage
issued from the data owner, when legally required; iv) undertake security measures to
protect the data; and v) comply with all the instructions issued by the control governmental authority.
Data users receive the information from data administrators and must: i) keep the data
confidential and only use it according to the authorization given; ii) inform the data owner
of the use given to the information; iii) safeguard the conditions of data protection; and iv)
comply with all the instructions issued by the control governmental authority.
Both data users and data administrators must comply with additional specific regulation
concerning operational issues in Colombia and transfer of data.
The new Bill introduces timeframes for the availability of the so-called "negative financial data"' 1 3 in data bases. The general rule is that negative data shall only remain in
databases twice as long as the time during which the debtor was delinquent, without exceeding four years. As an exception to the time-frame availability and as an incentive for
delinquent debtors to pay their default obligations, the Bill includes a grace period of six
months once the law becomes enforceable. Upon payment of debts and obligations, negative financial records must be erased from databases.
The Bill has quite a few controversial articles. Among them, Article 5(f) deals with
international transfer of data. This article provides, inter alia, that data can be transferred
to international databanks under the law without the consent of the data owner in those
cases provided as long as the data controllers and data processors verify that foreign laws
provide similar guarantees and rights to the owner of the data.
On the other hand, the Bill states that the Superintendent of Finance and the Superintendent of Industry and Commerce shall perform controlling and surveillance data protection activities. These entities belong to the central government and cannot really be
deemed as privacy authorities, at least under the terms and conditions as such authorities
are understood in the United States, Canada, and Europe.
112. The Bill provides that such consent is not necessary in case of collection and transfer of the "financial
data" (as defined in the Bill). But the Constitutional Court seemed to clarify that notice and consent was
needed in allcases. At the time of writing of this article, Ruling No. C-1011 is still pending official
publication.
113. Data concerning delay in financial payments or credit obligations.
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Even though a data protection regulation has been requested by some sectors in Colombia for years, the new regulation is far from becoming a comprehensive data privacy
statute. The Bill does not regulate data privacy in key sectors, such as labor (workplace
privacy), health, pensions, education, and children's information usage. And the new regulation involving commercial and financial activities has already raised comments, questions, and concerns from companies that could qualify as data administrators or users.
In the following months, we should expect special regulation and decisions from the
Superintendent of Finance and the Superintendent of Industry and Commerce. We hope
that this gives clarity and confidence in the gathering and transfer of data.
Colombia made a major step with this new regulation. But the road ahead looks quite
confusing and controversial.
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